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Now fully a generation ago, the Supreme Court decided Employment
Division v. Smith, which held that religious believers generally have no
right to exemptions from neutral and generally applicable laws.1 But in
the twenty-five years since Smith, the situation has grown more complex.
Shortly after Smith, Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act (RFRA)2 and later the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons

*
© 2016 Christopher C. Lund. Associate Professor of Law, Wayne State University
Law School. An earlier draft of this piece was presented at a conference held at the
University of San Diego Law School, and I’d like to express my thanks to the helpful
editors at the San Diego Law Review for their work on it. This Article shares much of its
text with “Keeping Hobby Lobby in Perspective,” a book chapter I wrote for the forthcoming
book, THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (Micah Schwartzman, Zoe Robinson,
and Chad Flanders eds., 2016).
1. 494 U.S. 872, 878–79 (1990).
2. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to -4 (2012)).
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Act (RLUIPA).3 And many states followed suit, either adopting state
Religious Freedom Restoration Acts (state RFRAs) or construing generously
the religious-freedom provisions of their state constitutions.4 As a result,
the compelling-interest test discarded by Smith now again applies to the
federal government and more than half the states. And there have been
other developments too. The Supreme Court’s adoption of the ministerial
exception in Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC,5 for example, carved out a
constitutional exception for internal church decisions that sits in some
tension with Smith.
Yet these protections for free exercise have also grown more controversial.
Last term, the Supreme Court decided the Hobby Lobby case, holding that
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act protected for-profit corporations.6
The year before, the New Mexico Supreme Court decided Elane Photography,
about whether a Christian photographer could refuse to photograph a
lesbian couple’s wedding on grounds of religious conscience.7 Hobby
Lobby and Elane Photography raise important legal questions. But they
also have changed the political debate. These two cases—probably more
than any others—have become the face of free exercise to the general public.
It is not clear that free exercise can withstand this association. After
Smith, religious exemptions depend on legislative support, which in turn
hinges on popular support. In recent years, proposed state RFRAs have
been shot down in several places, largely because of fears of cases like
Hobby Lobby and Elane Photography. No state RFRA has yet been repealed.
But no legislation can survive if public opposition to it grows sufficiently
strong.
What the debate has often lacked is a sense of perspective. Hobby Lobby
and Elane Photography are important cases. But, statistically speaking,
they are outliers. The majority of RFRA and state RFRA cases have little
to do with discrimination or sexual morality or the culture wars. Those
cases get almost no attention, even from experts in the field. There have
probably been around a few hundred state RFRA cases, which sounds like
a lot though it only amounts to about one or two cases per state per year.
Few of those cases look like Elane Photography. Perhaps my count is

3. Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (2000) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000cc to -5 (2012)).
4. See generally Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A Look
at State RFRAs, 55 S.D. L. REV. 466 (2010) (examining state RFRAs and the various issues
they present).
5. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694,
710 (2012).
6. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014).
7. See Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 2013-NMSC-040, ¶ 1, 309 P.3d 53,
58–59.
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mistaken, but so far I count two: Elane Photography itself, and a recent
addition, Arlene’s Flowers.8 To be sure, other controversies have been
settled and still others resolved administratively. And no doubt the future
will bring other similar cases. Surely no one believes Elane Photography
to be an isolated event.
Even so, the number of Elane Photography cases will probably still be
a small fraction of RFRA and state RFRA cases overall. A single fractious
issue, highly unrepresentative of the bulk of the cases, is driving the
discussion on both the left and the right. One side now supports state
RFRAs in large part because it wants to protect the religious claim in
Elane Photography; the other side now opposes state RFRAs for precisely
the same reason. There are many things odd about this, one being that the
religious claim in Elane Photography was so decisively rejected despite
New Mexico’s state RFRA. (The religious claim in Elane Photography
ultimately went before three Human Rights Commission judges, one state
district judge, three state court of appeals judges, and five state Supreme
Court Justices—and it never got a single vote from any of them.)9 But the
more important point here is that the bulk of RFRA and state RFRA cases
look nothing like Elane Photography.
I. RFRA, STATE RFRAS, AND RELIGIOUS MINORITIES
This leads into my central point. Whatever else can be said of them,
RFRA and state RFRAs have been valuable for religious minorities, who
often have no other recourse when the law conflicts with their most basic
religious obligations. Take a case out of Texas involving a five-year-old
Native American boy in the Texas public school system.10 He wanted to
wear his hair long, in conformity with the Apache religious beliefs of his
family. This was a deeply held religious conviction: the boy’s hair had
never been cut, and his father’s hair hadn’t been cut in ten years, though
he almost lost his job because of it. But the school district refused to make
any exception, claiming various reasons for the ban on long hair—hygiene,
safety, and security.11 Those reasons might have made sense, but for one

8. State v. Arlene’s Flowers, No. 13-2-00871-5, 2015 WL 720213 (Wash. Super.
Ct. Feb. 18, 2015) (denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment).
9. Elane Photography, 2013-NMSC-040, ¶¶ 4, 9–10, 309 P.3d at 59, 60.
10. A.A. ex rel. Betenbaugh v. Needville Indep. Sch. Dist., 611 F.3d 248, 253 (5th
Cir. 2010).
11. Id. at 253–54.
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thing. The school board’s policy did not ban long hair generally. It banned
long hair for boys. The school board had no trouble with girls having long
hair.12 Forced now to come up with some reason why this one little boy
had to cut his hair when all the girls didn’t, the school had to go in a
different direction. This Native American kindergartener, the school
district patiently explained to the Fifth Circuit, had “twice been mistaken
for a girl while at school.”13 Some parents will surely be bothered by their
child occasionally (though briefly) being misidentified as a girl. But the
idea that the government has a compelling interest in preventing that
misidentification—an interest strong enough to justify the destruction of
Native American religious identity—struck the Fifth Circuit as obviously
mistaken.14 But the Fifth Circuit could only protect the Native American
child because of Texas’s state RFRA.15
Or consider an example out of Kansas.16 Mary Stinemetz was a Medicaid
patient in need of a liver transplant. She was also a Jehovah’s Witness, who
objected to the blood transfusion that an ordinary liver transplant would
require. With technology’s advance, however, has come a newfangled
medical procedure called a bloodless liver transplant, which does not involve
a blood transfusion and which is actually cheaper than an ordinary liver
transplant. But Kansas had no facility capable of doing bloodless liver
transplants. The nearest one was in Omaha, in Nebraska.
Unfortunately for Stinemetz, Kansas’s Medicaid had a general policy
against reimbursing out-of-state procedures, and it refused to make any
exception for her.17 If that refusal seems hard to understand, the Kansas
Court of Appeals felt the same way. The court concluded that Kansas’s
Medicaid agency had “failed to suggest any state interest, much less a
compelling interest, for denying Stinemetz’s request.”18 Stinemetz ultimately
won this case. Struck by its facts, the Kansas Court of Appeals construed

12. Id. at 257. The policy said that “[b]oys’ hair shall not cover any part of the ear
or touch the top of the standard collar in back.” Id. at 253 (alteration in original).
13. Id. at 269.
14. See id. at 271–72.
15. If one reads the entire case, it also says a lot about the world in which religious
minorities live. The boy’s parents had feared that this very thing might happen to them.
They were reluctant to move to Needville. And before they moved, they sought assurances
from the school district that their child would be able to keep his long hair. Id. at 254–55.
But the school district refused to say one way or the other, insisting that the parents had to
move first and enroll in the public schools before they would make a determination. After
the parents moved, the school district denied them an exemption. See id. at 255–56. Without
exemptions, religious minorities will have to think carefully about where they can live.
16. Stinemetz v. Kan. Health Policy Auth., 252 P.3d 141 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011).
17. Id. at 143.
18. Id. at 155.
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the religious freedom provision in the Kansas state constitution to incorporate
RFRA’s compelling-interest standard.19
This story, however, does not end happily. By the time litigation ended,
Stinemetz’s problems had progressed to the point that she was no longer
eligible for a transplant. She died of liver failure the year after her victory
in the Kansas Court of Appeals.20 This does not necessarily imply that
Stinemetz died for want of a religious exemption. There may have been
other obstacles to Stinemetz actually getting a liver transplant, and there
is no guarantee the transplant would have gone successfully. All we can
say is that, had Kansas offered her a religious exemption from the beginning,
Stinemetz would have had a better chance.
Stinemetz is many things at once. It is a story of government intransigence
in the face of dire religious need. It is a straightforward explanation of
the need for RFRA and state RFRAs. It is also a rejoinder to the argument
that religious accommodations necessarily amount to religious favoritism.
Stinemetz illustrates how one can support religious exemptions without
any commitment to the truth of the underlying religious claims. Almost
no one reading this will share Mary Stinemetz’s religious beliefs about
blood transfusions; most of us will find them hard even to fathom. But
there is nothing wrong with us deciding to let her live anyway. There is,
in other words, a perfectly good secular reason to accommodate religious
conscience.21
These two cases are not anomalous. Many RFRA and state RFRA claims
find support from all parts of the religious and political spectrum. Gonzales
v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal was an important
victory for the Brazilian group using hoasca in their religious rituals22—
and it now has a cousin case, Church of the Holy Light.23 Holt v. Hobbs24

19. Id. Soon after, Kansas’s legislature codified Stinemetz’s holding when it passed
Kansas’s state RFRA. See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-5301 to -5305 (2013).
20. Brad Cooper, Jehovah’s Witness Who Needed Bloodless Transplant Dies, KANSAS
CITY STAR (Oct. 25, 2012), http://www.kansascity.com/news/local/article310218/Jehovahs
Witness-who-needed-bloodless-transplant-dies.html [https://perma.cc/6CCN-7VU6].
21. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 83 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
22. 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
23. See Church of the Holy Light of the Queen v. Mukasey, 615 F. Supp. 2d 1210,
1211–12 (D. Or. 2009) (enabling members of the Brazilian Santo Daime religion to drink
Daime tea, which contains DMT, as part of their religious rituals). On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit narrowed the scope of the district court’s injunction. Church of the Holy Light of
the Queen v. Holder, 443 F. App’x 302, 303 (9th Cir. 2011).
24. 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015).
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was an important victory for Muslims and was supported by a tremendously
diverse coalition of folks, liberal and conservative, religious and not. Other
cases have involved Muslim women seeking the right to wear unobtrusive
veils at work.25 One powerful prison RFRA decision gave a Muslim woman
the right to avoid cross-gender pat-down searches, which a judge found
totally unnecessary in context.26 RFRA and state RFRAs have been used
to challenge no-beard policies of police and fire departments, sometimes
by Muslims,27 sometimes by Orthodox Jews.28 One Texas state RFRA
case gave the Santeria the right to continue their religious practices
sacrificing animals.29 One federal RFRA case involved a Sikh employee
at the IRS who sought the right to wear a kirpan (a ceremonial sword) that
had been dulled down; after a federal district court dismissed her case, the
Fifth Circuit reversed it for further examination.30 And there are sympathetic
cases not involving religious minorities. An important and surprisingly
often litigated claim is whether churches can distribute free food to the
homeless.31 The way these statutes sometimes work, the churches would
be in the clear if they would simply sell the food to the homeless. City
officials seem to have a hard time understanding why the churches just
don’t do that instead. And just as important as the results here are the
rationales. It is striking how often judges in these cases make biting comments
about the government’s reasons for denying a religious exemption.32

25. EEOC v. GEO Grp., Inc., 616 F.3d 265, 267–69 (3d Cir. 2010); Webb v. City
of Phila., 562 F.3d 256, 258 (3d Cir. 2009).
26. See Forde v. Baird, 720 F. Supp. 2d 170, 172, 178 (D. Conn. 2010).
27. Potter v. District of Columbia, 558 F.3d 542, 544 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Fraternal
Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 360 (3d Cir.
1999).
28. Litzman v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t., No. 12 Civ. 4681(HB), 2013 WL 6049066, at
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2013).
29. Merced v. Kasson, 577 F.3d 578, 581 (5th Cir. 2009).
30. See Tagore v. United States, 735 F.3d 324, 325–26 (5th Cir. 2013). She convinced
the Fifth Circuit to remand her case because the government had not established any real
security risk. Id. at 331–32.
31. See, e.g., Chosen 300 Ministries, Inc. v. City of Phila., No. 12-3159, 2012 WL
3235317 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 2012) (granting in part plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction);
Abbott v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 783 So. 2d 1213 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
32. See A.A. ex rel. Betenbaugh v. Needville Indep. Sch. Dist., 611 F.3d 248, 272
(5th Cir. 2010) (“[W]hile a school may set grooming standards for its students, when those
standards substantially burden the free exercise of religion, they must accomplish something.”);
Merced, 577 F.3d at 593–94 (“The city has absolutely no evidence that Merced’s religious
conduct undermined any of its interests. . . . Merced has performed these sacrifices for sixteen
years without creating health hazards or unduly harming any animals.”); Forde v. Baird, 720
F. Supp. 2d 170, 178 (D. Conn. 2010) (concluding that the government has “offered no
evidence establishing a compelling governmental interest in permitting male correctional
officers to pat search Forde” and, in fact, “there may be penological disadvantages to crossgender pat searches”); Stinemetz v. Kan. Health Policy Auth., 252 P.3d 141, 160 (Kan. Ct.
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If one wants reasons to be inclined toward the compelling-interest test
for free exercise, another body of decisions also deserves attention. RFRA
and state RFRAs are legislative enactments. But in a number of states,
the compelling-interest test for free exercise has come about through state
courts interpreting the religious-freedom provisions of their state constitutions.
The particular cases where courts make that decision are almost uniformly
revealing. The facts themselves often illustrate why courts decide to go
with Sherbert/Yoder rather than Smith. Alaska, for example, adopted the
compelling-interest test in an old case about the protection of Native
American funeral rituals.33 Kansas adopted the compelling-interest test
under the state constitution in Stinemetz, discussed above.
Mississippi did the same thing in another Jehovah’s Witnesses case—
this one involving a woman shot by her daughter.34 The woman’s chances
in surgery were fair even without a blood transfusion. And she insisted
she would rather die than get a blood transfusion, for which she might be
damned for all eternity. But the local district attorney’s office insisted
that she was needed in court to testify, and so it forced a blood transfusion
on her over her objections.35 Why it needed to do this is somewhat of a
mystery. The mother was apparently conscious and able to communicate,
and any statement she made identifying the daughter would have been
plainly admissible in court.36 The Mississippi Supreme Court responded
by holding this unconstitutional under the state constitution. Mississippi
is full of Protestants, but there are few Jehovah’s Witnesses in positions
of power. Probably no one on that court shared the mother’s views about
blood transfusions. Yet the court seemed deeply troubled that the government
would inflict such extraordinary and unnecessary psychic distress on an
innocent human being. That sentiment drove the court to its forceful
conclusion: “in this state we take seriously the right to the free exercise
of religion.”37
Although some of these are tales of almost callous indifference to religious
need, this is not some broadside against the government. Government
officials are probably much more sensitive about these issues than the

App. 2011) (“[Kansas] has failed to show any state interest, much less a compelling interest,
for denying Stinemetz’ request for prior authorization for the out-of-state liver transplant.”).
33. See Frank v. State, 604 P.2d 1068, 1069–70 (Alaska 1979).
34. In re Brown, 478 So. 2d 1033, 1035 (Miss. 1985).
35. Id. at 1035–36.
36. See id. at 1036.
37. Id. at 1039.
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average person. But America is a large country, and with a large enough
sample size, mistakes are inevitable. And this is not to say that the
religious believers in these cases are all valorous people. Religious folks can
be obnoxious, intolerant, and hypocritical. They frequently are stubbornly
inflexible, often unwilling to bend even slightly on the issue of religious
obligation. In one prison case, an Orthodox Jew wanted to have pe’ot
(sidelocks) down to the bottom of his ears, while the prison insisted they
stop at the middle of his ear.38 The parties were fighting—quite bitterly—
over half an inch. “Both the Plaintiff and the Defendants,” said the perturbed
district judge, “seem unable to grasp that their area of dispute, both literally
and figuratively, is narrow.”39 Maybe this particular plaintiff was being
difficult, although even that seems a little unfair to say. But in any event,
the court was right to rule in his favor.40 Free exercise belongs not only
to nobles but also to rascals; when it is possible, we should accommodate
even those who do not make it easy for us.
We have been talking about indifference, but we should also not forget
the role played by misunderstanding. My first academic talk was about
the congressional chaplaincies. At some point, I surprised a colleague
with an offhand remark about the military chaplaincies, which seem to me
to be on much more solid constitutional footing.41 My colleague took me
to task, calling military chaplains unnecessary. There was no reason, he
said, why laypeople in the military could not do everything that chaplains
currently do.
The problem, of course, is that not everyone sees it that way. My colleague
came from a Protestant background. And Protestants and Catholics—just
to use examples from within the Christian tradition—differ in their views
about the respective roles of clergy and laity. My friend was Protestant,
and there’s no problem with that. But he was blind to the fact that his
views represented only one side of a debate that has spanned centuries.
He had no idea that other people—other Christians, in fact—might have
an entirely different view than he did. Years later, precisely the same
misunderstanding surfaced in a district court decision out of Texas. A
Catholic inmate in administrative segregation had effectively lost all access

38. Benning v. Georgia, 864 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1360 (M.D. Ga. 2012).
39. See id. at 1362.
40. The court ruled in the plaintiff’s favor, ultimately concluding that all of the prison’s
purported justifications failed to pass muster. See id. at 1369 (“[W]hen questioned by the
Court, [the prison administrator] acknowledged that sideburns extending to the bottom of the
earlobe would not ‘concern us that much, other than it is not in keeping with the language in
the posted standard within our current grooming policy.’”).
41. This is the Court’s position too. See McCreary Cty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844,
875 (2005) (“[I]f the government cannot pay for military chaplains a good many soldiers
and sailors would be kept from the opportunity to exercise their chosen religions.”).
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to a priest, and thus could not receive the church’s sacraments. But this did
not trouble the prison chaplain as much as it did the inmate. “[C]ommunion
and confession,” the Protestant chaplain explained to the court, “did not
have to be administered by priests but could be done by lay people.”42
In a pluralistic society, these kinds of misunderstandings are to be expected,
even among well-intentioned people. And if such misunderstandings are
possible in modern-day America between Protestants and Catholics—two
groups whose present differences seem modest if not imperceptible—you
can only imagine the other kinds of culture clash we will see in modernday America.
II. SOME THOUGHTS ON TAILORED STATUTORY EXEMPTIONS
If there is a case for religious exemptions, there remains the question of
how they should be done. One model is specific statutory exemptions.
Legislatures can draft statutes addressed to the particular religious needs
of a particular religious community in the face of a particular legal
conflict.43 But this ends up being a somewhat unrealistic way of handling
the need for exemptions. It will radically under protect free exercise.
Return again to the issue of Jehovah’s Witnesses and blood transfusions.
At least at first glance, it seems like an issue capable of legislative resolution.
Say we agree Jehovah’s Witnesses should be protected in their religious
beliefs against blood transfusions. How would we go about doing it?
Imagine a statute that said the following:
No Jehovah’s Witness shall be in any way legally punished for choosing not to
have a blood transfusion. And no Jehovah’s Witness shall be permitted to deny
anyone else (including their minor children) a blood transfusion.

This language comes from someone with neither training nor experience
in drafting legislation. It is not perfect, but perhaps it captures some basic
intuitions. Imagine that a state legislature enacted this provision and
considered itself done with the issue.
But then the cases come. Again consider Stinemetz, the case about the
Jehovah’s Witness in Kansas’s Medicaid system who wanted a bloodless
42. Ramon v. Dretke, No. 9:10CV158, 2011 WL 6963609, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 13,
2011).
43. For an example, see 42 U.S.C. § 1996a(b)(1) (2012) (“[T]he use, possession, or
transportation of peyote by an Indian for bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes in
connection with the practice of a traditional Indian religion is lawful, and shall not be
prohibited by the United States or any State.”).
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liver transplant done out of state.44 The case for an exemption seems quite
strong—the Kansas Court of Appeals reached out to protect the religious
claim with a Sherbert/Yoder-style interpretation of its state constitution.
But it is not clear what this statute means for the religious claim here,
because the statute does not speak directly enough to the situation.
Or take another case, this one about a Jehovah’s Witness in a childcustody proceeding.45 The mother is a Jehovah’s Witness; the father is not.
The father says the mother should be denied custody, because one day the
kids might get sick and need a blood transfusion. And if that happens, she
might not give it to them because of her religious beliefs. None of that
has happened, but it could happen and, in any event, that’s the father’s
argument.46 Here too, it is not clear what the statute means for this situation.
Or take a third case, this one about the intersection of Jehovah’s
Witnesses and tort law’s doctrine of avoidable consequences. The most
famous case here is Munn v. Algee, which involved a Jehovah’s Witness
injured in a car accident who died because she refused a blood transfusion.47
The court ruled that the defendant motorist, who negligently caused the
accident, didn’t have to pay damages for the death because it was a
consequence that the plaintiff could have avoided.48 Yet there are cases
harder than Munn v. Algee, like a recent one from Michigan involving a
Jehovah’s Witness with an upcoming surgery who told her doctor that she
would die before taking a blood transfusion.49 The doctor knew his patient’s
wishes when he committed the alleged malpractice, which in turn made a
blood transfusion indispensable. After the patient died—she refused the
transfusion—her estate sued the doctor.50 As in Munn v. Algee, the plaintiff
lost.51 And maybe that too is right, though the implication is that a doctor
could commit any kind of malpractice resulting in the death of a Jehovah’s
Witness, and it would never be actionable as long as a blood transfusion
would have prevented the death. But again, however, the statute is not
written with the requisite specificity to address this situation.
The point is simple. If we rely exclusively on legislatures to address
these issues and resolve them in advance through particularized religious
exemptions passed in the normal legislative process, we will find ourselves
sorely frustrated. The situation will end up resembling the South Pacific—
an archipelago of religious exemptions in a wide ocean of religious need.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
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924 F.2d 568, 570–71 (5th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 577.
Braverman v. Granger, 844 N.W.2d 485, 488–89 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014).
Id. at 489–90.
Id.

LUND (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 53: 163, 2016]

9/14/2018 3:12 PM

RFRAs and Religious Minorities
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

The problem, simply put, is that the cases vary far too much. There are
just too many religions with too many religious beliefs, and the cases that
are going to arise have such different postures, postures that are often
unforeseeable and sometimes almost unimaginable.
On top of that, this whole discussion was premised on some improbable
starting assumptions. We were imagining, for example, that state legislatures
would take time to debate what approach to adopt with respect to Jehovah’s
Witnesses and their religious beliefs about blood transfusions. It is hard
to imagine any legislature having time for that. Moreover, while Jehovah’s
Witnesses are a small group, they are also a well-known group with a
well-known belief about blood transfusions. Less prominent religious
groups with less prominent beliefs will have an even harder time attracting
legislative attention and support.
To be sure, legislatures can be counted on for accommodations in
certain types of circumstances. Congress is certainly good at stepping in
when a religious group loses a case in the Supreme Court.52 Congress is
also quite good with recurring situations that implicate the joint interests
of a variety of religious groups. The Section 702 exemption, which enables
religious groups to discriminate on the basis of religion in hiring, is a good
example of that.53 But even here, there is reason for caution. Even as
Congress passed the Section 702 exception, it missed the conflict that
would arise between religious organizations and other kinds of discrimination
laws—a conflict only mediated by judicial creation of the ministerial
exception.
But all this really just misses the point. Federal law is not the problem, by
and large. The real problem is the state and local governments, who regulate
more heavily, have less time and resources for thoughtful deliberation, and
get less attention both from civil rights groups and religious organizations.
Consider again the issue of religious discrimination in hiring. Congress
passed the Section 702 exemption, but a surprising number of states forbid

52. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), superseded by statute, American
Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-344, 108 Stat. 3125
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1996(a) (2012)); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986),
superseded by statute, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 & 1989
(NDAA), Pub. L. No. 100-180, 101 Stat. 1019 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 774(a)-(b) (2012));
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982), superseded by statute, Technical and
Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988 (TMRA), Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102 Stat. 3342
(codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 3127 (2012)).
53. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 702, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-1 (2012).
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religious discrimination in hiring without making any special exception
for religious groups.54
In his famous study, James Ryan estimated that Congress and the states
have created, by statute, as many as 2,000 religious exemptions. He was
quite optimistic about legislative ability to accommodate religion. Ryan
noted, for example, how “each of the states grants some unique exemptions
to religious groups,” such as how “California allows religious exemptions
from mandated autopsies.”55 Ryan’s work was very well done, but his
point can be taken almost the opposite way. California may recognize
religious objections to autopsies, but what about the other forty-nine states?
Those who object to autopsies—the Hmong, Orthodox Jews, Navajo
Indians—live in other states too. And this state of affairs has worsened
since Ryan’s work, because of Boerne.56 Now religious groups do not need
one exemption; they need fifty-one. O Centro protected a Brazilian group’s
use of hoasca from federal authorities, which is wonderful for the group’s
members who happen to live in New Hampshire and Vermont—the two
states that do not criminalize DMT (the active ingredient in hoasca). But
the other forty-eight states all criminalize DMT, and none of them make
any exception for its religious use.57
III. SOME THOUGHTS ON THE COMPELLING-INTEREST
TEST AND FREE EXERCISE
In an important sense, then, things are all or nothing. We can insist on
specific statutory exemptions, each oriented around a particular conflict
between legal and religious obligation. But only salient conflicts will create
legislative battles, and only uncontroversial religious practices will get
accommodated. The fundamental choice then becomes whether or not to
have an exemption regime based on a broadly applicable standard (such
as the compelling-interest test).

54. See Christopher C. Lund, In Defense of the Ministerial Exception, 90 N.C. L.
REV. 1, 26–27 (2011).
55. See James E. Ryan, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An
Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1445, 1448 (1992) (citing CAL. GOV’T
CODE § 27491.43 (Deering 1991)).
56. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (holding the federal RFRA
inapplicable to state and local law).
57. With the exception of New Hampshire and Vermont, states have adopted verbatim
the Uniform Controlled Substances Act (which criminalizes DMT). See Lund, supra note
4, at 473–74 (explaining these points and providing citations).
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A. The Parade of Horribles
One way to begin the debate is in analytical terms. When we choose a
legal standard for religious exemptions, we set a balance between two
risks—the risk of denying exemptions that should be granted and the risk
of granting religious exemptions that should be denied. To talk like this,
of course, presumes we will be able to agree on those issues—on when
exemptions should be given and when they should be denied. And universal
agreement is indeed impossible. But it is striking how much agreement
there often is, at least at the level of results.58
If we begin this way, one thing is striking. Thoughtful people oppose
RFRA, just as thoughtful people opposed Sherbert/Yoder. But those folks
have few examples of RFRA being interpreted in threatening ways. Consider
Justice Scalia’s opinion in Smith. In explaining his fears of the Sherbert/
Yoder test, he cites a dozen cases in the lower courts, all involving challenges
to important governmental interests.59 In her concurrence, Justice O’Connor
refers to this part of the opinion as a parade of horribles.60 But the phrase does
not quite fit, because none of Justice Scalia’s cases involved inappropriately
granted exemptions. All of the cases denied the religious claims at issue.
This is striking. Supreme Court Justices have clerks with the finest legalresearch skills, and Justice Scalia had every inclination to portray the
Sherbert/Yoder standard in its worst possible light. But he could not find
a single example of the Sherbert/Yoder standard being used to give an
exemption that he found inappropriate—or that he thought other people
might find inappropriate. Stocked with twenty-five years of cases in fifty
states, he could not find one example.61 If this is right, it is astonishing.
The Sherbert/Yoder era involved a legal rule with all the risk of error
placed on one side of the ledger. And Sherbert/Yoder was thrown out anyway.

58. In earlier work, I have asked why there is often so much agreement about
particular exemption cases, but so little agreement about the doctrine necessary to reach
the right results in those cases. Christopher C. Lund, Exploring Free Exercise Doctrine:
Equal Liberty and Religious Exemptions, 77 TENN. L. REV. 351, 371 (2010) (“But given
that there is so much agreement on the level of results, why is there so much disagreement
on the level of doctrine?”).
59. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 889 (1990).
60. Id. at 902 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
61. Justice O’Connor saw this at the time. “The Court’s parade of horribles . . . not
only fails as a reason for discarding the compelling interest test, it instead demonstrates just the
opposite: that courts have been quite capable of applying our free exercise jurisprudence
to strike sensible balances between religious liberty and competing state interests.” Id.
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We are now another twenty-five years down the road. Of course, if you
tell people now that there is zero risk of an inappropriately granted
exemption, they will not believe you. Even before Hobby Lobby, there
was Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission.62 Even so, less has
changed than people think. There are still few examples of RFRA and
state RFRAs giving controversial exemptions. Of course, religious people
sometimes make tendentious claims, particularly prisoners.63 But those
claims do not win. At every turn, the tendency has been toward under
enforcement not over enforcement.
To be sure, there are troubling religious exemptions. But they are not
the ones given by courts under the compelling-interest test. The troubling
exemptions are the ones issued by legislatures. It is hard to imagine any
court giving a religious exemption from a generally applicable vaccination
law.64 But the vast majority of legislatures have given such exemptions.
It is hard to imagine any court on its own exempting religious believers
from child abuse or neglect statutes, but legislatures do so routinely. Maybe
the exceptions can be justified. Maybe, as in the case of child neglect, a
legislature could conclude that the harm is utterly incapable of being
deterred and that the intense nature of the underlying religious beliefs reduces
the retributive case. But I am a strong supporter of religious exemptions,
and I would not exempt this conduct. The federal government and something
like forty-six states exempt religious hospitals from performing sterilizations
and abortions,65 which is sensible in theory but recklessly overbroad
in practice.66
62. Thomas involved the religious claim of landlords who refused to rent to unmarried
couples in violation of state law. On appeal, the landlords initially won, but that opinion
was eventually withdrawn and the case dismissed for lack of standing. Thomas v. Anchorage
Equal Rights Comm’n, 165 F.3d 692, 696 (9th Cir. 1999), withdrawn, 192 F.3d 1208 (9th
Cir. 1999), vacated, 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000).
63. For some nonprison examples, see United States v. Lepp, 446 F. App’x 44, 46
(9th Cir. 2011) (upholding a Rastafarian’s marijuana conviction despite RFRA, in part
because he was caught selling a pound of it to an undercover officer); Griffin v. Cudjoe,
2012 OK CIV APP 46, ¶ 21, 276 P.3d 1064, 1068–69 (denying that a minister has a
constitutional right to embezzle funds from his church and spend them on flagrantly
nonchurch purposes).
64. See, e.g., Workman v. Mingo Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 419 F. App’x 348, 353–54
(4th Cir. 2011) (refusing to give a religious exemption from West Virginia’s requirement
that public schoolchildren be vaccinated, and citing a laundry list of cases with similar
holdings without any counterexamples).
65. See Robin Fretwell Wilson, Matters of Conscience: Lessons for Same-Sex Marriage
from the Healthcare Context, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING
CONFLICTS 77, 85, 90–91 (Douglas Laycock et al. eds., 2008).
66. Most agree about nonemergency situations. In the absence of a medical
emergency and time constraints, if a woman comes into a Catholic hospital for sterilization
or an abortion, it seems perfectly sensible to have her go someplace else. The problem is
when there is no time or ability to send the woman someplace else. See Motion to Dismiss
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All this, though, reinforces the key point that the compelling-interest
test on its own rarely results in inappropriate exemptions. No academic
or judicial discussion of the compelling-interest test ever seems complete
without some reference to a likely parade of horribles. In her Hobby Lobby
dissent, Justice Ginsburg feared religious objectors would be entitled to
provide insurance without coverage of blood transfusions, antidepressants,
and vaccinations.67 In Smith, Justice Scalia feared courts giving exemptions
to child labor laws and manslaughter statutes.68 But such hypothetical
claims seem less scary when one realizes that they are rarely brought and
do not win. In Reynolds, Chief Justice Waite hinted that a system of religious
exemptions would necessarily mean exemptions for involuntary human
sacrifice.69 With a hundred years of hindsight, we see that pretty clearly
as a straw man.
A common position, even for people supportive of religious exemptions,
is to argue that RFRA is simply too strong. Strict scrutiny is too potent a
standard. Instead we should go with some lesser standard—say intermediate
scrutiny or rational basis with bite. 70 I do not mean to attack these
alternatives; anything is better than Smith. But why this issue has been so
important to so many is lost on me. In deciding whether strict scrutiny is
too potent a standard, the single most important thing must be the results
that it yields. So the argument that strict scrutiny is too powerful seems
anemic to me, without examples of exemptions erroneously granted.
Otherwise, the objection is just semantic. The results of strict scrutiny are
fine, but the name needs to be changed for some reason.71

at 7, Means v. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, No. 2:13-CV-14916-DPH-PJK (E.D.
Mich. Mar. 12, 2014), ECF No. 23.
67. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2805 (2014) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting).
68. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 889 (1990).
69. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878).
70. See, e.g., Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., If Judges Were Angels: Religious
Equality, Free Exercise, and the (Underappreciated) Merits of Smith, 102 NW. U. L. REV.
1189, 1264 (2008) (“rationality with bite”); Rodney A. Smolla, The Free Exercise of
Religion After the Fall: The Case for Intermediate Scrutiny, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 925,
943 (1998) (“intermediate scrutiny”); cf. Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Religious
Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1465, 1503 (1999) (“burden is justified”).
71. Eugene Volokh, for example, has worried that a weak strict-scrutiny test used
for free exercise will dilute the strong strict-scrutiny test used for free speech. See Volokh,
supra note 70, at 1500. There is logic to this argument, although it seems a bit strange that
one constitutional right should be deliberately weakened in order to make sure that another
constitutional right is not accidentally weakened.
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B. The Fear of Inconsistency
Sometimes the fear about inappropriately granted exemptions morphs
into a different kind of concern—a concern about inconsistency. Professor
Ira Lupu, for example, has developed this argument well in a recent paper.72
Lupu has long been a thoughtful and sophisticated critic of exemptions. He
agrees that cases of over enforcement are rare or nonexistent, but he sees
the risk of inconsistency as grave enough to threaten basic rule-of-law
values.73
But the charge of inconsistency is not a perfect fit. Or maybe inconsistency
is not quite the right word. In an important way, Lupu and I agree on a
central point—that a chief problem of free exercise over the past fifty
years has been the simple diversity of cases.74 America marries tremendous
religious pluralism with federalism and a thick regulatory state. This
results in an incredible variety of cases that makes it virtually impossible
for discretion-less doctrinal rules to develop. In other areas of law, situations
recur. Over time, general standards distill down into a set of administrable
bright-line rules. The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches
and seizures,” and reasonableness is, of course, among the most standard
ish of legal concepts. But over the years, the Court has tried, with mixed
success, to work the Fourth Amendment down into a set of discrete rules—
the core being the requirement of a warrant based on probable cause.75
But the big question is whether there is any real evidence grounding these concerns.
Volokh cited two free-speech cases over the previous fifteen years, where courts upheld
viewpoint-based restrictions on speech and used the free exercise analogy as justification.
Id. at 1500 n.108. He also cited two other free-speech cases where courts seemed more
inclined to uphold such restrictions on free speech, though the cases did not actually come
to that issue. Id. at 1501 n.111. But the key point is this. In all of Volokh’s cases,
the references to free exercise seemed gratuitous and unnecessary to the result. In the
cases upholding arguably unconstitutional restrictions on speech, courts clearly wanted to
uphold those restrictions: they almost certainly would have done the same thing without
the free-exercise analogy. To make the same point a different way, consider whether the
weak version of strict scrutiny adopted in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), is
likely to weaken strict scrutiny in the context of free speech. It is possible, I suppose. But
such a counterintuitive claim would require strong empirical support, and there seems to
be little of that for this proposition, at least with regard to free exercise.
72. Ira C. Lupu, Hobby Lobby and the Dubious Enterprise of Religious Exemptions, 38
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 35 (2015).
73. Id. (concluding that the compelling-interest test will “tend to be strong in rhetoric
and weak in practice,” but that the “application of vague, general standards for adjudicating
religious exemption claims cannot satisfy values associated with the rule of law”).
74. See id. at 72–73.
75. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014) (explaining the Court’s
“general preference to provide clear guidance to law enforcement through categorical
[Fourth Amendment] rules”). There are areas, of course, where the Fourth Amendment’s
standard has not translated into a set of bright-line rules. Think of the “special needs” cases,
where the Court engages in wholesale balancing between governmental and individual
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But the Sherbert/Yoder standard never could be reduced like that. This
is no one’s fault; it is just that the situations were never reoccurring enough.
The Supreme Court would have a case one year involving a Christian
objecting to having a picture on her driver’s license.76 The next year there
would be a case about yarmulkes in the military;77 the year after that it
would be Muslim worship services in prison.78 Every case would involve
a different religious practice, a different law being challenged, and a different
set of governmental interests behind each law.
This is why the charge of inconsistency fails, or at least needs to be
refashioned. There simply are not enough cases for them to be inconsistent
with one another. If there were true inconsistency, the normal procedures
of appellate review would smooth them out. Lupu seems to think apples
are being treated differently from apples. But that is not what is going on.
Apples are being treated differently from oranges, which are being treated
differently from pineapples—and that, of course, may be entirely appropriate.
Lupu’s charge of inconsistency then becomes a different kind of attack.
The Fourth Amendment sets out a general standard—reasonableness—
that courts have tried to reduce to a set of discrete rules. But now consider
reasonableness as it shows up in negligence law, in the general requirement
that people act reasonably under the circumstances. Justice Holmes always
hoped that reasonableness would be broken down into a set of bright-line
rules that could be implemented by judges rather than juries.79 That never
happened.80 This then led to the understandable charge that juries were
interests. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652–53 (1995). The
persistent criticism has been that this balancing inevitably waters down the right, even the
core of the right. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 639–40 (1989)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that the “special needs” exception has the Court engaged
in “an extended inquiry . . . in which it balances ‘all of the circumstances surrounding the
search or seizure and the nature of the search or seizure itself’ . . . [and] [t]he result is special
needs balancing analysis’ deepest incursion yet into the core protections of the Fourth
Amendment” (quoting United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985))).
76. Jensen v. Quaring, 472 U.S. 478 (1985) (mem.), aff’g Quaring v. Peterson, 728
F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1984).
77. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 504 (1986).
78. O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 345 (1987).
79. See, e.g., OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 98 (Mark D. Howe
ed., 1967) (“But supposing a state of facts often repeated in practice, is it to be imagined
that the court is to go on leaving the standard to the jury forever?”).
80. See Kenneth S. Abraham, The Trouble with Negligence, 54 VAND. L. REV.
1187, 1192 (2001) (“[T]he rejection of Holmes’ proposal is [usually] explained on the
ground that even recurring cases differ sufficiently in their details that development of per
se rules to govern them has proved infeasible”).
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not applying a preexisting legal standard, but instead were making one up
as they went along. Best conceived, this is Lupu’s charge against the
Sherbert/Yoder regime, which echoes Justice Scalia’s in Smith: it goes
against the rule of law to have such a fuzzy standard vesting such discretion
in judges.81
Yet there are some differences here worth noting. In negligence cases,
the defendant is usually a private party, and the remedy is usually damages,
which renders the problem of fair notice particularly acute. By contrast,
with free exercise, the defendant is usually the government. And the remedy
is almost always declaratory or injunctive relief. Damages are rarely
pertinent to redressing the harm, rarely sought, and rarely available anyway.82
But of course, at some point the truth will out. There is a core of Lupu’s
and Scalia’s charge that cannot be deflected. RFRA and state RFRAs,
like the Sherbert/Yoder test before them, give judges an irreducible degree
of discretion in balancing. But once the fears of dangerous results and
inconsistency are removed, it is not altogether clear what the complaint is
about. In Smith, the principal objection was that judicial balancing impinged
upon core democratic values. Even at the time, this was a little hard to
accept, given the ubiquity of balancing in constitutional law.83 But in any
event, this objection no longer carries any weight at all. Sherbert and
Yoder were the Court’s creations. But RFRA and state RFRAs are legislative
enactments—products of, not obstacles to, democratic decision-making.84
81. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879, 890 (1990); see also Antonin Scalia,
The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989) (suggesting a general
preference for rules over standards).
82. RFRA does not authorize damages against the federal government. Oklevueha
Native Am. Church of Haw., Inc. v. Holder, 676 F.3d 829, 840 (9th Cir. 2012); Webman
v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 441 F.3d 1022, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 2006). RLUIPA does not
authorize damages against state governments. Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 288,
(2011). State RFRAs differ on whether damages are allowed. Compare VA. CODE ANN.
§ 57-2.02(D) (2014) (Virginia’s RFRA) (“A person whose religious exercise has been
burdened by government in violation of this section may assert that violation as a claim or
defense in any judicial or administrative proceeding and may obtain declaratory and
injunctive relief from a circuit court, but shall not obtain monetary damages.”), with OKLA.
STAT. tit. 51, § 256(A) (2014) (Oklahoma’s RFRA) (“Any person whose exercise of
religion has been substantially burdened by a governmental entity in violation of this
section may assert that violation as a claim or defense in any judicial or administrative
proceeding and may obtain declaratory relief or monetary damages.”).
83. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96
YALE L.J. 943 (1987); see also Volokh, supra note 70, at 1491–92 (making this same point).
84. And of course, the same allegations about discretion, balancing, and inconsistency
are routinely made with regard to the Establishment Clause. See, e.g., Utah Highway
Patrol Ass’n v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12, 13, 21, 14, 15 & n.3, 17, 22 (2011) (Thomas,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (quoting various descriptions of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence as being “in shambles,” “nebulous,” “erratic,” “no principled basis,”
“purgatory,” “impenetrable,” “ad hoc patchwork,” “limbo,” “incapable of consistent application,”
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C. The Fear of Denominational Discrimination
A final charge against the compelling-interest test, which also relates
back to the charge of inconsistency, is a claim about denominational
neutrality. At the level of text, RFRA is denominationally neutral and perfectly
so. RFRA lays out a rule applicable to every free exercise dispute; the same
compelling-interest test applies, regardless of the religious denomination,
belief, or practice at issue. The results of cases will vary based on their
facts, of course, but the standard to be applied is the same.
One persistent fear has been that the compelling-interest standard will, in
application, be unfair to minority faiths. This is a fair concern. Judges are
only human. They have biases and make mistakes. That these faults might
work to the detriment of minority faiths should not surprise anyone. Back
in the Sherbert/Yoder era, some detected a pattern of uneven enforcement
in Supreme Court decisions.85 This concern is hard to substantiate. Again,
the paucity of cases and the variety of circumstances make it impossible
for charges of inconsistency to really stick.86 But the fear is not illogical—
I have expressed the same worry on occasion.87

“our mess,” “little more than intuition and a tape measure”) (citations and quotations omitted).
For a common sense reply, see Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d 840, 858
(7th Cir. 2012) (Hamilton, J., concurring) (“The solution is not to require those troubled
by government endorsement of religion to stop complaining and adopt an austere, Senecan
stoicism. Rather, as judges, we must do our level best to overcome our individual perspectives.
We can do so by deliberately trying to see the situation from others’ points of view.”).
85. This is Tushnet’s famous charge in the Sherbert/Yoder era that “sometimes
Christians win but non-Christians never do.” Mark Tushnet, “Of Church and State and
the Supreme Court”: Kurland Revisited, 1989 SUP. CT. REV. 373, 381. In the twenty-five
years since Tushnet’s claim, however, there have been a number of powerful (and unanimous)
Supreme Court victories for religious minorities. See Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 856
(2015) (Muslim); Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S.
418, 425 (2006) (Christian Spiritist); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 712 (2005)
(Wiccan, Satanist, Asatru, Church of Jesus Christ Christian); Church of the Lukumi Babalu
Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 524 (1993) (Santeria).
86. Recent empirical studies have suggested that at least some religious minorities,
like Muslims, win in the lower courts at significantly lower rates than other groups. See,
e.g., Michael Heise & Gregory C. Sisk, Free Exercise of Religion Before the Bench:
Empirical Evidence from the Federal Courts, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1371, 1386 (2013)
(“[C]laimants from other religious communities were nearly twice as likely to prevail as
Muslims.”). But the reasons for this are unclear. It may be judicial bias, either conscious
or unconscious. But it could be that religious minorities seek exemptions from different
rules. Without knowing more, it is impossible to conclude that the differential treatment
is a product of discrimination.
87. See Lund, supra note 4, at 496.
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But however deep this problem goes, getting rid of RFRA would not
solve it. Getting rid of RFRA would only make it worse. At bottom, it
does not matter whether RFRA is, in application, denominationally neutral
in some perfect sense. The question is whether RFRA is better than Smith.
And if we are concerned about denominational neutrality, Smith is the
worst-case scenario. Justice Ginsburg’s Hobby Lobby dissent made a number
of astute points. But, in my mind, the most troubling part was her passing
thought that it might be better to get rid of the compelling-interest test than
to assume the possible risk that minority claims might be disfavored by it.88
We should not make the perfect the enemy of the good, especially when
the perfect is so unobtainable as to be imaginary. We all know that religious
folks will never be allowed to conduct religious practices of involuntary
human sacrifice. We do not need to throw out everyone else’s religious
liberty due to some misplaced sense of fairness to those folks.
IV. CONCLUSION
This piece was written largely before events that transpired in Indiana—
events that make a postscript to this piece almost unavoidable. In the last
five years, six more states have adopted state RFRAs, and in each case the
Elane Photography issue was part of the debate. But Indiana was different.
Now the debate seems to have nothing else left in it. One side sees Elane
Photography as the raison d’être for state RFRAs; the other side sees it
as the bête noire. But on both sides, Elane Photography is all that matters.
An unfortunate consequence is that all the other kinds of state RFRA
claims—including the sympathetic ones mentioned here—have gotten
completely lost in the shuffle. For those interested in protecting free exercise
without protecting the claim in Elane Photography, there are several
options going forward. The first is the simplest and probably the
best—one can, by statute, simply exclude for-profits. There is nothing
path-breaking about this suggestion. The state RFRAs in Pennsylvania
and Louisiana do this already.89 And it would not imply anything about
88. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2805 (2014) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting) (“There is an overriding interest, I believe, in keeping the courts ‘out of the
business of evaluating the relative merits of differing religious claims’. . . or the sincerity
with which an asserted religious belief is held. Indeed, approving some religious claims
while deeming others unworthy of accommodation could be ‘perceived as favoring one
religion over another,’ the very ‘risk the Establishment Clause was designed to preclude.’”
(quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in
judgment))).
89. Drafting here would be crucial. Pennsylvania and Louisiana exclude for-profit
corporations by defining “person” statutorily as “[a]n individual or a church, association
of churches or other religious order, body or institution which qualifies for exemption from
taxation under section 501(c)(3) or (d) of the Internal Revenue Code.” 71 PA. CONS. STAT.
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the rightness or wrongness of Hobby Lobby—the Supreme Court there
was stuck with the statute Congress passed. A more complicated and more
uncertain alternative would be to create a global exclusion of civil rights
claims, as Texas and Missouri both do.90
This recalls the old adage, “Half a loaf is better than no bread.” But this
is not half a loaf. This is nine-tenths of a loaf, and the other tenth is moldy
anyway. Texas’s RFRA, by my estimation, has been the most powerful
of the state RFRAs, despite its categorical exclusion of civil rights claims.
To be sure, there is something deeply troubling about these exclusions.
One virtue of RFRA was how it created a single standard to govern all
claims of religious liberty. The point of these exclusions is to create a
double standard, to stack the deck against certain disfavored claims. But
there is a different and more charitable view of these exclusions—that
there generally is a compelling government interest in a particular class of
cases, and that case-by-case adjudication of compelling interest risks too
much. And besides, these exclusions have a long history. In the Sherbert/
Yoder era, the Court itself crafted exclusions for prisons, the military, and
tax systems.91 State RFRAs often have litanies of legislatively created
exclusions—no drug-law challenges, no prisoner suits, no religious claims
contesting child support.92 The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA) itself provides more support for the idea of
exclusions: it may be strange to have a federal statute that protects religious
liberty only in the contexts of land use and institutionalized persons, but
Congress prudently thought that this was better than nothing.

§ 2403; see 13 LA. STAT. ANN. § 5234(1). The problem is that this definition leaves many
religious nonprofits in a very uncertain position. It is not clear, for instance, whether this
definition would even cover religious schools. It would be probably better to exclude forprofits directly, perhaps with “person” defined simply to exclude “businesses” and with
“businesses” defined along the lines of “any entities that are organized and operated for
profit, including a sole proprietorship, partnership, limited liability company, corporation,
company, firm, society, joint-stock company, unincorporated association, or other similar
entity.”
90. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 1.307(2) (West) (“[N]othing in these sections shall be
construed to establish or eliminate a defense to a civil action or criminal prosecution based
on a federal, state, or local civil rights law.”); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §
110.011 (West) (“[T]his chapter does not establish or eliminate a defense to a civil action
or criminal prosecution under a federal or state civil rights law.”).
91. See Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 684 (1989) (taxes); O’Lone v. Estate of
Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 345 (1987) (prisons); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 504
(1986) (military).
92. See Lund, supra note 4, at 491–93 (providing various examples of exclusions).
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One thing is vital. The baby must not be thrown out with the bathwater.
However one feels about Hobby Lobby and Elane Photography, RFRAs
and state RFRAs do valuable work for religious minorities—work that no
longer seems to get much attention from anyone. Twenty-five years ago,
free exercise was associated strongly with the difficult position of religious
minorities in an overwhelmingly Christian America. Things are more
complicated now, but that aspect of the story remains a true and vital part
of it.
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